The article by Alex Pollitt explores the sterile cockpit rule. Originally a fixed-wing regulation that prohibits non-essential activity and conversation during critical phases of flight, the author examines how it applies in helicopter operations, where flight profiles and workloads are much more variable.
This article by Alex Pollitt challenges the common assumption that faster responses always indicate greater skill or competence. It argues that slowness can reduce errors, enhance situational awareness, and improve decision making under stress.
This article by Alex Pollitt recounts a serious inflight emergency after multiple, interacting failures, including smoke in the cockpit, loss of control inputs, engine overspeed and confusing indications. The author looks at how the flight crew were forced to handle ‘interactive complexity’ to recover the situation.
In this article, Alex Pollitt argues that labelling complacency as a cause of errors in aviation (and human performance generally) is overly simplistic and unhelpful. Instead, the article suggests complacency is a symptom, not a root cause, emerging from a complex mix of organisational, task, cultural, and environmental factors rather than a standalone mental state.
Distributed situation awareness: what is it? This article explains how the traditional understanding of situation awareness, originally defined as a cognitive process inside an individual’s mind, has evolved into a distributed concept that includes both human and non-human elements within a socio-technical system.
In this article from competent aviators.com Alex Pollitt examines the limits of cognitive performance and how we can mitigate cognitive overload.
Any conscious mental processing we do that focuses our attention results in cognitive workload. Workload management is about maintaining a balance between level of demand and the mental effort required to meet that demand based on our available resources. Demand can go up, but resource can also go down. When demand outstrips resource the outcome is a decline in performance.
We discuss how CRM training for experienced crews must move beyond reinforcing familiar concepts and instead focus on recalibrating judgement and behaviour in realistic operational contexts. Grounded in adult learning principles, effective training leverages experience, reflection, and authentic challenge to influence how non-technical skills are applied in line operations.
This brand new (2026) review by Okine and colleagues presents one of the most comprehensive examinations to date of how human factors (HF) research has evolved within aviation safety. What does it tell us about the growth and development of human factors in aviation, and are there any lessons in there for how we train crew resource management on the front line of aviation?
An easily readable source of quality information on the effects of stress and its impact on attention, decision making and teamwork, NASA’s technical memorandum Effects of Acute Stress on Aircrew Performance examines how situational stress influences pilot cognition and skilled performance in demanding flight conditions.
Old, but not outdated, these two documents from 1988 give an example of how trainers can develop scenario based, table-top exercises, to facilitate learning in non-technical skills.