This excellent article from safety and risk management specialist Jamie Mallinder on LinkedIn examines the difference between objective risk and risk perception, why there is often a gap between the two, and what the implications are on safety.
This article by Alex Pollitt recounts a serious inflight emergency after multiple, interacting failures, including smoke in the cockpit, loss of control inputs, engine overspeed and confusing indications. The author looks at how the flight crew were forced to handle ‘interactive complexity’ to recover the situation.
In this article, Alex Pollitt argues that labelling complacency as a cause of errors in aviation (and human performance generally) is overly simplistic and unhelpful. Instead, the article suggests complacency is a symptom, not a root cause, emerging from a complex mix of organisational, task, cultural, and environmental factors rather than a standalone mental state.
This overview by Helmreich et al. details the history and development of CRM describing the five “generations” of CRM’s evolution.
The paper is from 1996 and describes the evolution of the first four generations of CRM training development and then goes on to propose what would later become established as the fifth generation of CRM – the development of threat and error management (TEM).
A short safety video by Bruce Webb, former Chief Pilot for Airbus Helicopters in the United States and safety advocate. This video focuses on the helicopter sector and looks at “human error” this time not as a pilot issue but from a maintenance perspective. In this video, Bruce breaks down how to mitigate for human error in maintenance.
Here’s one for the helicopter community. An introduction to the principles of threat and error management with a particular focus on how it affects rotary wing operations.
In helicopter operations, the TEM model is particularly valuable due to the unique challenges and operational complexities involved. Helicopter pilots often face varied and dynamic environments, such as adverse weather conditions, confined landing zones, and low-altitude operations. The TEM model helps pilots anticipate, detect and manage threats, errors and Undesired Aircraft States (UAS, and keep margins of safety.
In this paper Capt Dan Maurino gives an excellent explanation of what TEM actually is.
This article from NAVIMINDS.COM introduces us to expectation bias, examines some case study examples of where it has played a role in aviation accidents, and looks at possible mitigation strategies.
This Briefing Note from the Flight Safety Foundation discusses the causes and consequences of interruptions and distractions and describes techniques for reducing and dealing with them. The focus in this material is on practical actions for both individual flight crew members and their companies.
In this scientific paper, leading Human Factors scientist Paul Salmon reviews the relevance of the term human error and asks whether it still a useful concept in practice. Has it become misleading, inappropriate, or even dangerous? The authors offer a set of recommendations on ‘error management’ based on their conclusions.