Written by Source: International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics via Science Direct
This study by Captain Vlaskamp and colleagues from TU Delft in the Netherlands examines how airline pilots experience startle and surprise in real operational contexts and evaluates their use of a structured startle/surprise recovery method known as the “Reset Method.”
Startle and surprise—sudden, unexpected stimuli or cognitive mismatches—are known to temporarily degrade performance, decision-making, and situational awareness and have been implicated in loss-of-control incidents. Previous research largely tested recovery methods in simulators; this paper addresses the gap in understanding how pilots perceive these methods when applied in actual flight operations.
Using a survey of 239 airline pilots, the authors found that most respondents felt the Reset Method improved mental preparedness and reduced stress when responding to startle and surprise events. Pilots reported that the technique helped with regaining composure and clarity of thought. However, not all steps were applied consistently, and many pilots reported difficulty fitting the method into highly time-critical situations where an immediate response might be required. A key theme was the “startle paradox”: the very situations where pilots need the method most are the contexts in which they find it hardest to use it because of the urgency to act.
The study also identified that the urge to take immediate action, lack of familiarity, and challenges fitting the method into procedural flows are significant barriers to its consistent use.
The significance of this research lies in its operational insight into pilot-reported benefits and limitations of startle and surprise recovery methods. It provides empirical evidence that such techniques can be valuable tools for performance resilience, but also highlights the need for training integration, simplification of methods, and enhanced recognition strategies to ensure they are usable under high stress. These findings have direct implications for CRM, TEM, and upset management training design. Future work should refine implementation strategies and address the startle paradox in high-workload flight contexts.
The Reset Method — Practical Steps
While phrasing varies slightly across operators, the Reset Method generally consists of three tightly coupled actionsdesigned to be applied immediately after a startle or surprise event:
- Interrupt / PauseConsciously recognise that a startle or surprise has occurred and create a brief mental pause. This step counters the instinctive “act now” response that often leads to inappropriate or premature actions.
- Physiological Reset (Breathing)Apply one or two controlled breathing cycles (e.g. slow nasal inhale, extended exhale). This helps reduce sympathetic nervous system activation and stabilise heart rate, buying cognitive bandwidth.
- Cognitive Reset (Reframe & Prioritise)Re-establish a basic mental model: What is the aircraft doing? What is the immediate threat? What is the priority?This naturally feeds into simple prioritisation (e.g. aviate → stabilise → manage).
The method is intentionally short, non-technical, and aircraft-agnostic, making it usable across fleets and operational contexts.
Abstract:
A significant safety challenge airline pilots contend with is the possibility of experiencing startle and surprise. These are cognitive-emotional responses that may temporarily impair performance and that have contributed to multiple fatal loss of control events. Several self-management methods exist that are intended to facilitate recovery from startle and surprise, but these have only been tested in simulator experiments. The current study addresses this research gap by surveying the perceptions of 239 airline pilots on the utility and benefit of a method which they use in operational practice– the “Reset Method”. Overall, the survey results revealed that pilots felt the method improved mental preparedness, and reduced stress. A reported reason for not applying the method was the urge to act quickly. In addition, not all steps of the method were applied equally, and some pilots found the method difficult to fit into the existing procedures of several time-critical scenarios (e.g., aircraft upsets and emergency landings). We recommend training self-management methods in scenarios which carry the most risk of negative effects of startle and surprise. We also recommend instilling awareness of the ‘startle paradox’: self-management techniques are most difficult to apply in situations where they are most beneficial. Method shortening and simplification may facilitate application. Future research should focus on refining the method’s implementation, addressing the startle paradox, and understanding the transferability of startle and surprise management methods to other safety critical industries defined by complex sociotechnical interactions.